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Abstract
Background: H7N9 human cases were first detected in mainland China in March 2013. Circulation of this virus has
continued each year shifting to typical winter months. We compared the clinical and epidemiologic characteristics
for the first three waves of virus circulation.
Methods: The first wave was defined as reported cases with onset dates between March 31-September 30, 2013,
the second wave was defined as October 1, 2013-September 30, 2014 and the third wave was defined as October
1, 2014-September 30, 2015. We used simple descriptive statistics to compare characteristics of the three distinct
waves of virus circulation.
Results: In mainland China, 134 cases, 306 cases and 219 cases were detected and reported in first three waves,
respectively. The median age of cases was statistically significantly older in the first wave (61 years vs. 56 years, 56 years,
p < 0.001) compared to the following two waves. Most reported cases were among men in all three waves. There was
no statistically significant difference between case fatality proportions (33, 42 and 45%, respectively, p = 0.08). There
were no significant statistical differences for time from illness onset to first seeking healthcare, hospitalization, lab
confirmation, initiation antiviral treatment and death between the three waves. A similar percentage of cases in all
waves reported exposure to poultry or live poultry markets (87%, 88%, 90%, respectively). There was no statistically
significant difference in the occurrence of severe disease between the each of the first three waves of virus circulation.
Twenty-one clusters were reported during these three waves (4, 11 and 6 clusters, respectively), of which, 14 were
considered to be possible human-to-human transmission.
Conclusion: Though our case investigation for the first three waves found few differences between the epidemiologic
and clinical characteristics, there is continued international concern about the pandemic potential of this virus. Since
the virus continues to circulate, causes more severe disease, has the ability to mutate and become transmissible from
human-to-human, and there is limited natural protection from infection in communities, it is critical that surveillance
systems in China and elsewhere are alert to the influenza H7N9 virus.
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Background
Avian influenza A(H7N9) virus (referred to as H7N9
hereafter) was detected in mainland China in March
2013 with the identification of three severely ill patients
with unexplained pneumonia [1–3]. This virus had not
previously been detected in humans and posed a poten-
tial for pandemic spread [4]. At the time of its emer-
gence, little was known about the virus including the
spectrum and severity of illness, risk factors for infection
and severity, transmissibility from person-to-person, and
geographic distribution of H7N9 in humans and animals.
To better understand this virus, active case monitoring
and environmental surveillance were initiated.
Per Chinese notifiable disease reporting guidelines [5, 6],
H7N9 positive cases by real-time reverse transcriptase
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), conventional RT-
PCR, virus isolation, or a 4-fold rise in H7N9 antibody
titers in serology are reported to the National Health and
Family Planning Commission (NHFPC). After a case is
identified, active surveillance to determine exposure his-
tory and contact monitoring is initiated by the local Center
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). As part of this
investigation, specimens from possible exposure locations
(e.g., live poultry markets (LPM), commercial poultry
farms, or bird feeding areas) are collected and tested for
H7N9. Further, in some provinces routine environmental
surveillance in LPMs is conducted by local CDCs to
monitor viruses in the environment and to provide
evidence for pandemic risk assessment [7, 8]. For this
surveillance, specimens are collected from various
locations and stalls in LPMs and tested for influenza
viruses throughout the year.
Since H7N9 emerged, there have been three distinct
waves of circulation emerging in the northern hemi-
sphere typical winter months. In this study, we examined
differences and similarities between these three circula-
tion waves to inform future prevention and control
measures.
Methods
The first wave of H7N9 virus circulation is defined as
detected cases with onset dates from March 31 to
September 30, 2013. The second wave of H7N9 virus
circulation is defined as detected cases with onset dates
from October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014. The third
wave of H7N9 virus circulation is defined as detected
cases with onset dates from October 1, 2014 to September
30, 2015. In this manuscript, we compare the first three
waves of virus circulation in mainland China by examin-
ing the epidemiology, geographic distribution, clinical
severity, the possible person-to-person spread, and sea-
sonality of this virus.
For this study, suspected and confirmed cases were de-
fined per World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines
[1]. Most cases were identified through the Pneumonia
of Unknown Etiology (PUE) surveillance system which
identifies severe pneumonia cases without a known
cause of illness [3]. In response to H7N9 emergence, the
NHFPC issued the Protocol for the Prevention and Con-
trol of H7N9 which established enhanced surveillance
for suspected H7N9 cases [5, 6], including oversampling
of influenza-like illness (ILI) cases at sentinel hospitals
participating in the National Influenza Surveillance Sys-
tem [9, 10], the implementation of a two week enhanced
surveillance for all ILI case-patients in the counties or
districts where H7N9 cases were detected, and moni-
toring of close contacts of confirmed H7N9 cases lead-
ing to the identification of additional cases. Further,
cases were identified less commonly through routine
multi-respiratory pathogen surveillance and screening
for individuals showing signs of ILI at provincial and
international borders.
A severe case was defined as having any of the follow-
ing: a chest x-ray indicative of multi-lobar lesions or a
>50% increase in the size of the lesions within a 48 h
period; dyspnea or a respiratory rate of greater than 24
times per minute for adults; severe hypoxia defined as a
less than or equal to 92% oxygen saturation while receiv-
ing 3–5 l of supplemental oxygen per minute; or shock,
acute respiratory distress syndrome, or multiple organ
dysfunction syndrome [11]. Non-severe cases were de-
fined as those who did not meet the criteria for severity.
To examine the person-to-person transmissibility of
this virus, we examined data from contact investigations
and case clusters. Active field investigations were con-
ducted for each H7N9 case per guidelines established by
the China CDC. Case contacts were actively monitored
for 7 days for respiratory symptoms after the last unpro-
tected exposure to the case. Any contacts that developed
fever (axillary temperature ≥37.5 °C) and any respiratory
symptoms were isolated and specimens were collected
and tested for H7N9. Any two cases with an epidemio-
logic link either with a common exposure or contact with
an H7N9 case were considered part of a cluster [5, 6].
Data collection for H7N9 confirmed cases and their
close contacts were determined by the NHFPC to be
part of a continuing public health outbreak investigation
and exempt from institutional review board assessment.
Case data were obtained from the China Information
System for Disease Control and Prevention (CISDCP),
the notifiable diseases data system, and the H7N9 avian
influenza information system, the web-based database
for clinical and epidemiological information, and from
epidemiological reports from field investigations of con-
firmed H7N9 cases. To compare the characteristics from
the three waves, we used simple descriptive statistics and
tests of proportions to determine statistical significance
between the waves. Non-parametric tests, including the
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Wilcoxon and Kruskal Wallis tests were used to compare
continuous variables such as age and time between illness
onset and other dates of interest. Chi-square tests were
used to compare frequencies of demographic and other
categorical variables for the three waves. SPSS 17.0 (SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA) was used for analyses.
Results
Epidemiologic characteristics comparison
During the first wave, 134 cases were identified and re-
ported to the NHFPC in mainland China. From emer-
gence of the virus in February through May 2013, the
virus rapidly spread through eastern mainland China
impacting several provinces and municipalities (Fig. 1).
Ninety-six percent of cases were reported in April and
May 2013. After the initial peak activity in April and
May 2013, there was decline in circulation with only two
cases and one death reported between June and Septem-
ber 2013. The majority of case-patients were older men
with underlying health conditions and most experienced
severe diseases. During the first wave, 70% of cases were
men (n = 94) (Fig. 2) and the median age was 61 years
(range: 3–91 years). Forty-four died resulting in a case
fatality proportion (CFP) of 33% (Table 1).
During the second wave, there were 306 cases and 128
deaths (CFP: 42%) in mainland China (Table 1). The
peak in reported cases occurred between January and
February 2014 (Fig. 1). The number of reported cases
more than doubled from the first wave to the second
wave. Men accounted for 69% (n = 211) of reported cases
(Fig. 2) and this proportion was similar to the pro-
portion of male case-patients in the first wave (70%
vs. 69%, p = 0.80). The median age of case-patients
during the second wave was 58 years (range: 1–88
years) which was slightly lower compared to the first
wave (p = 0.03).
During the third wave, there were 219 cases and 98
deaths (CFP: 45%) in mainland China (Table 1). The
peak in reported cases occurred between January and
February 2015 (Fig. 1). The number of cases was less
compared to the second wave. Men accounted for 69%
(n = 152) of reported cases during the third wave (Fig. 2)
which was similar to the previous two waves (69% vs.
70%, 69%, p = 0.97). The median age of case-patients re-
ported in the third wave was 56 years (range: 9 months-
88 years) which was slightly lower compared to the first
wave (p = 0.01), and was similar to the second wave
(p = 0.69). The CFP of cases increased from 33% (first
wave) to 42% (second wave) and 45% (third wave),
there was no statistically significant difference of CFPs
between the three waves (p = 0.08). The proportion of
deaths was highest among cases 60 years or older for the
second and third waves compared to the first wave (46%
vs. 59%, 57%). During the first wave, the highest CFPs
were among cases 60–74 years of age (41%) and 75–
89 years of age (54%). In the second wave, the CFPs for
the same age groups were 58% and 60% and in the third
wave, the CFPs were 55% and 64% for the same age
groups. No deaths among children less than 15 years
of age were reported in the first two waves and 1
Fig. 1 Epidemic Curve of Confirmed Influenza A(H7N9) Case-Patients in mainland China by Province and Date of Onset of Illness
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death in a case-patient less than 15 years of age was
reported in the third wave. Among cases who died,
the median age was 66.5, 63.0 and 58.5 years in each
of the three waves, respectively. The median age of
death in the third wave was lower than in the first
wave (p = 0.001) and was similar to the second wave
(p = 0.06). The CFP for males and females was similar
between these three waves (p = 0.28 and p = 0.25,
respectively).
Exposure comparison
During the first three waves, the majority of cases re-
ported exposure to poultry or LPMs. Exposure to
poultry was defined as direct contact with live poultry
such as feeding, cleaning, slaughtering or exposure to
the environment where poultry were kept (e.g., backyard
or visiting a live poultry market). Of 127 (95% of cases)
first wave cases with exposure history information, 26
(21%) reported direct poultry exposure and 84 (66%) re-
ported visiting of LPMs prior to illness onset (Table 2).
Among those cases visiting LPMs, 15 (18%) reported
working at a LPM and 69 (82%) reported only visiting
the LPM. Thirteen cases in the first wave (10%) reported
no exposure to poultry or LPMs. Four (3%) reported ex-
posure to other H7N9 case-patients with no other
known exposure implying possible limited human-to-
human transmission. Among 296 (97%) second wave
cases with exposure history information, 56 (19%) re-
ported exposure to poultry and 203 (69%) reported visit-
ing a LPM prior to illness onset. Among those patients
visiting LPMs, 40 (20%) reported working at a LPM, 163
(80%) reported only visiting a LPM. Seven (2%) reported
exposure to other H7N9 case-patients with no other
known exposure, implying possible human–to-human
transmission and 3 (1%) reported both exposure to other
H7N9 case-patients and common poultry exposure with
Fig. 2 Gender Comparison of Case-Patients for Wave 1 and Wave 2 of Influenza A(H7N9) Virus Circulation
Table 1 Gender and Age Comparison of Influenza A(H7N9) Case-Patients and Deaths in Mainland China During the First (March 31-
September 30, 2013), Second (October 1, 2013 – September 30, 2014) and Third (October 1, 2014 – September 30, 2015) Waves of
Circulation
Age (Years) Total Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
N (%) Death (CFP%) N (%) Death (CFP%) N (%) Death (CFP%) N (%) Death(CFR%)
0–14 42(6.4) 1(2.4) 6(4.5) 0(0) 19(6.2) 0(0) 17 (7.8) 1 (5.9)
15–29 35(5.3) 11(31.4) 6(4.5) 1(16.7) 19(6.2) 7(36.8) 10 (4.6) 3 (30.0)
30–44 106(16.1) 26(24.5) 20(14.9) 3(15.0) 58(19.0) 14(24.1) 28 (12.8) 9 (32.1)
45–59 193(29.3) 75(38.9) 31(23.1) 7(22.6) 81(26.5) 31(38.3) 81 (37.0) 37 (45.7)
60–74 182(27.6) 96(52.7) 46(34.3) 19(41.3) 81(26.5) 47(58.0) 55 (25.1) 30 (54.5)
75–89 100(15.2) 60(60) 24(17.9) 13(54.2) 48(15.7) 29(60.4) 28 (12.8) 18 (64.3)
≥90 1(0.2) 1(100) 1(0.8) 1(100) 0(0) - 0 (0)
Total 659 270 (41.0) 134 44(32.8) 306 128(41.8) 219 98 (44.7)
Age median (range) 57 (9 months-91) 62 (13–91) 61 (2–91) 66.5 (27–91) 56 (1–88) 63 (20–86) 56 (9 months-88) 59 (13–83)
CFP Case Fatality Proportion
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reported H7N9 case-patients. Twenty-seven (9%) re-
ported no poultry or LPM exposure. Among 207 (95%)
third wave cases with exposure history information, 50
(24%) reported exposure to poultry and 136 (66%) re-
ported visiting a LPM prior to illness onset. Among
those patients visiting LPMs, 12 (9%) reported working
at a LPM, 124 (91%) reported only visiting a LPM. Four
(2%) reported exposure to other H7N9 case-patients
with no other known exposure implying possible
human-to-human transmission and 1 (1%) reported both
exposure to other H7N9 case-patients and common
poultry exposure. Sixteen (8%) reported no poultry or
LPM exposure. There was no statistically significant dif-
ferences in poultry or LPM exposure of cases among be-
tween these three waves (87%, 88%, 90% p = 0.614).
Geographic comparison
During the first three waves, 661 cases were reported by
543 townships, spanning 282 counties or districts, 92 cit-
ies and 17 provinces in mainland China. During the first
wave, cases were reported by 112 townships, spanning
71 counties or districts, 29 cities and 12 provinces.
During the second wave, cases were reported by 266
townships, from 165 counties or districts, 65 cities and
14 provinces. Ten provinces, 18 cities, 26 counties or
districts and 9 townships reported cases in both waves.
During the second wave, 4 provinces (Guangxi, Guizhou,
Jilin, and Xinjiang) reported cases for the first time.
Additionally, there were 47 cities, 139 counties or dis-
tricts, and 257 townships that reported cases for the first
time during the second wave. During the third wave, 219
cases were reported by 201 townships, spanning 138
counties or districts, 64 cities and 13 provinces in main-
land China. During the third wave, 1 province (Hubei)
reported cases for the first time. Additionally, there were
16 cities, 72 counties or districts, and 174 townships that
reported cases for the first time during the third wave.
The first wave cases were concentrated in Zhejiang
and Jiangsu Provinces and Shanghai municipality along
the Southeast Coast of mainland China accounting for
80% of total reported cases (Fig. 3). The geographic
distribution shifted further south during the second
wave with Guangdong and Zhejiang Provinces account-
ing for 66% of total cases reported (Table 3). During the
third wave, Guangdong and Zhejiang were still the two
provinces that reported the most cases, accounting for
54% of total number. And Fujian Provinces reported
19% cases of the total number. The H7N9 outbreaks
during these three waves are considered to be geograph-
ically sporadic since cases have been reported by 543 dif-
ferent townships, the lowest administrative level. Of
those townships, 462 reported only one case, 62 re-
ported two cases, 10 reported three cases, and 9 re-
ported more than four cases. Beyond this main
geographic distribution of cases, two other provinces be-
yond the main impacted reported cases in the second
and third waves. Jilin province in North-East China re-
ported 2 cases in the second wave and Xinjiang in
North-West China reported 10 cases in both the second
and third waves.
Severity comparison
Of 128 first wave cases with severity data, 110 (86%)
were considered severe, 264 (87%) of 303 cases were de-
fined as severe during the second wave, and 175 (86%)
of 204 cases in the third wave were considered severe.
There was no statistically significant difference among
the severity of cases during these waves (p = 0.894). Al-
though the proportion of non-severe cases did not vary
between the waves, during the second wave there was an
observed increase in the number of non-severe cases
identified. Forty-nine percent of non-severe cases identi-
fied during the second wave occurred in Guangdong
province (n = 19). And in the third wave, 6 provinces
reported 29 non-severe cases, of which Guangdong
reported 15 (52%) cases and Fujian reported 6 (21%)
cases. During all waves combined, non-severe disease
was more common among children <15 years of age
(41/42, 98%) than adults > =15 years (32/406, 7%). How-
ever, the percent of children with non-severe disease was
similar during the three waves (6/18, 33%; 19/39, 49%;
16/29 55%; p = 0.341).
Table 2 Exposure History of Influenza A(H7N9) Case-Patients During the First (March 31-September 30, 2013), Second (October 1,
2013 – September 30, 2014) and Third (October 1, 2014 – September 30, 2015) Waves of H7N9 Virus Circulation
Exposure Wave 1(N = 127) Wave 2(N = 296) Wave 3(N = 207)
Exposure to poultry 26 (20.5) 56 (19.0) 50 (24.2)
Exposure to live bird markets (LPM) 84 (66.1) 203 (68.6) 136 (65.7)
Working at a LPM 15 (17.9) 40 (19.7) 12 (8.8)
Visiting of LPMs 69 (82.1) 163 (80.3) 124 (91.2)
No exposure to poultry 13 (10.2) 27 (9.1) 16 (7.7)
Possible limited H-H transmission 4 (3.1) 7 (2.3) 4 (1.9)
Both possible limited H-H transmission and common exposure to poultry - 3 (1.0) 1 (0.5)
H-H Human-to-Human Transmission
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Nearly all of the case-patients from the waves reported
fever (97, 94 and 94%, respectively; Table 4). The next
most common symptom reported was cough (71, 86 and
82%, respectively). Of 466 case-patients from all three
waves with information about underlying health condi-
tions, 52% had at least one underlying condition. The
most commonly reported conditions were cardiovascular
or cerebrovascular disease (34%), metabolic diseases
(15%) and chronic lung disease (11%). There was no
statistically significant difference in the percent of cases
with underlying health conditions among the three
waves: 58%, 52% and 49% (p = 0.408).
Among case-patients, 90% were reported to have at least
one complication due to H7N9 virus infection. The most
common complications from infection included pneumo-
nia (87%), respiratory failure (69%), ARDS (66%), and
hepatic insufficiency (43%). More than half of cases (302,
67%) developed multiple organ failure. There were no sta-
tistically significant differences in any of the individual
complications experienced between the two waves except
Septic shock and Cardiac failure (Table 4).
We also compared the time durations from illness on-
set to different important epidemiological time points in
the course of clinical illness such as: first seeking health-
care, hospitalization, lab confirmation, initiation antiviral
treatment, and death between the three waves. The time
between illness onset and first seeking healthcare was
1 day (IQR:0–3 days) for the first wave, 1 day (IQR: 0–4
days) for the second wave, and 1 day (IQR: 0–3 days) for
the third wave. The time between illness onset and hos-
pital admission was 5 (IQR: 4–7) days, 5 (IQR: 3–7)
days, and 5 (IQR: 3–7) days for three waves, respectively.
The time between illness onset and lab confirmation
was 8 (IQR: 6–11), 8 (IQR: 6–11) and 8 (IQR: 6–10)
days for three waves, respectively. The median time be-
tween illness onset to initiation of antiviral treatment
and to death changed from 7 days (antivirals) and 21 days





Fig. 3 Geographic Distribution of Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Cases. a Provinces reported H7N9 cases in China. b Counties reported H7N9 cases as
of Wave 1. c Counties reported H7N9 cases as of Wave 2. d Counties reported H7N9 cases as of Wave 3
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and 16 days in the second and third waves, respectively
(Table 5). There were no statistically significant differ-
ences for the time from illness onset to hospitalization,
case confirmation, initiation of antiviral treatment, and
death between three waves of circulation.
Evidence of person-to-person transmission
During the three waves of virus circulation, case clusters
were identified and an investigation was conducted to
determine either common exposure or if possible human-
to-human transmission between the cases. Twenty-one
clusters of confirmed cases were reported during these
three waves (4, 11 and 6 clusters). Twenty of the clusters
each included 2 cases and one cluster included 3 cases.
These 21 clusters were thought to be possible human-to-
human transmission or to have a common epidemiologic
exposure. There was no statistically significant dif-
ference in the proportion of case-patients that oc-
curred in clusters during the waves (6, 8 and 5% of
reported case-patients, p = 0.62). Fourteen clusters
were considered to be possible human-to-human
transmission (which meant there were 14 cluster
index cases and 15 possible secondary cases), 3 clus-
ters were likely a common epidemiologic exposure,
and for 4 clusters the investigation could not rule
out a common exposure or confirm possible human-
to-human transmission. For the 21 index cases of
the clusters, 71% (15/21) were male and the median
age was 49 years (range: 9 months-87 years). And
for the 22 subsequently reported cases, 55% (12/22)
were male, and the median age was 26.5 (range: 1–
77 years). No statistical differences were observed
for sex and age between index and subsequently-
reported cases (p = 0.25, p = 0.14). All 21 index cases
(including 14 possible human-to-human transmission
cluster index cases) had live poultry related exposure
history before illness onset, including 17 cases who
had live poultry market exposure or were exposed to
poultry brought from a market, and 4 cases were exposed
to backyard poultry. Two clusters (each including 2 cases)
of 21 clusters occurred in the hospital settings as cases
were admitted to the same ward before the index case in
the cluster was diagnosed with avian influenza A(H7N9)
virus infection. The remaining 19 clusters were consid-
ered family clusters with 2 cases in each of 18 clusters
and 3 cases in one cluster. Among cases in these clus-
ters, 75% (15/20) of subsequently-reported cases had a
blood relationship with the respective cluster index
case. Given the limited number of clusters with possible
evidence of human-to-human transmission and the
more frequent occurrence of geographically sporadic
occurrence of cases, we conclude that there is no evi-
dence of sustained human-to-human transmission of
this virus.
Table 3 Human Influenza A(H7N9) Confirmed Case-Patients in Mainland China During the First (March 31-September 30, 2013) , Second
(October 1, 2013 – September 30, 2014) and Third (October 1, 2014 – September 30, 2015) Waves of the H7N9 Virus Circulation, by Province
Provinces Total Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
Zhejiang 185 71 45 10 93 38 47 23
Guangdong 182 68 1 0 109 37 72 31
Jiangsu 78 36 29 10 27 13 22 13
Fujian 63 17 5 0 17 5 41 12
Shanghai 47 28 33 18 8 7 6 3
Anhui 32 18 4 2 14 11 14 5
Hunan 26 11 2 1 22 9 2 1
Jiangxi 11 1 6 1 2 0 3 0
Xinjiang 10 9 0 0 3 2 7 7
Shandong 7 3 2 0 3 2 2 1
Beijing 6 2 2 0 3 1 1 1
Henan 4 1 4 1 0 0 0 0
Guangxi 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 0
Jilin 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 0
Guizhou 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1
Hebei 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Hubei 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Total 659 270 134 44 306 128 219 98
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Seasonality
For wave 1, illness onset began in February and extended
through May of 2013, beyond the typical colder or win-
ter months (Fig. 1). During the second wave, cases oc-
curred significantly earlier (median date onset 7 April
2013 for wave 1 vs 26 January 2014 for wave 2), begin-
ning in December 2013 and declining by February 2014.
During the third wave, continued reporting cases oc-
curred in November 2014, earlier than the second wave,
and declined by February 2015. These findings imply
Table 4 Clinical Characteristics of Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Case-Patients by Virus Circulation Wave
Total (N,%) Wave 1 (n, %) Wave 2 (n, %) Wave 3 (n, %) P
Main symptoms at early stage (N1 = 76,N2 = 227,N3 = 169)
Fever 445(94.3) 74(97.4) 213(93.8) 158(93.5) 0.444
Cough 386(81.8) 54(71.1) 194(85.5) 138(81.7) 0.019
Weakness 186(39.4) 29(38.2) 88(38.8) 69(40.8) 0.891
Muscle soreness 107(22.7) 20(26.3) 53(23.4) 34(20.1) 0.532
Othersa 170(36) 37(48.7) 70(30.8) 63(37.3) 0.018
Underlying medical conditions (N1 = 74,N2 = 226,N3 = 166) 242(51.9) 43(58.1) 118(52.2) 81(48.8) 0.408
Cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease 159(34.1) 29(39.2) 69(30.5) 61(36.8) 0.266
Metabolic diseases 68(14.6) 12(16.2) 37(16.4) 19(11.5) 0.359
Chronic lung disease 50(10.7) 12(16.2) 22(9.7) 16(9.6) 0.251
Chronic liver diseases 32(6.9) 3(4.1) 20(8.9) 9(5.4) 0.241
Hematological system diseases 14(3.0) 1(1.4) 9(4) 4(2.4) 0.441
Cancer 10(2.1) 2(2.7) 6(2.7) 2(1.2) 0.580
Rheumatic autoimmune disease 11(2.4) 5(6.8) 2(0.9) 4(2.4) 0.015
Immunosuppressive state 12(2.6) 1(1.4) 5(2.2) 6(3.6) 0.529
Chronic kidney diseases 16(3.4) 1(1.4) 6(2.7) 9(5.4) 0.186
Nervous system or neuromuscular dysfunction 6(1.3) 0(0) 4(1.8) 2(1.2) 0.500
Complications (N1 = 71,N2 = 219,N3 = 162) 406(89.8) 64(90.1) 197(90) 145(89.5) 0.985
Pneumonia 392(86.7) 64(90.1) 187(85.4) 141(87.0) 0.585
Respiratory failure 311(68.8) 47(66.2) 144(65.8) 120(74.1) 0.195
Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome(ARDS) 298(65.9) 42(59.2) 141(64.4) 115(71) 0.171
Hepatic insufficiency 193(42.7) 25(35.2) 90(41.1) 78(48.2) 0.148
Renal insufficiency 152(33.6) 23(32.4) 68(31.1) 61(37.7) 0.391
Septic shock 141(31.2) 14(19.7) 64(29.2) 63(38.9) 0.010
Cardiac failure 124(27.4) 16(22.5) 49(22.4) 59(36.4) 0.006
Neurologic complications 27(6.0) 2(2.8) 12(5.5) 13(8.0) 0.277
Disseminated intravascular coagulation 25(5.5) 3(4.2) 9(4.1) 13(8.0) 0.222
Rhabdomyalysis 17(3.8) 1(1.4) 6(2.7) 10(6.2) 0.115
Failure of two or more organs 302(66.8) 45(63.4) 139(63.5) 118(72.8) 0.127
N1: Number of individuals in Wave 1 who had clinical information, N2: Number of individuals in Wave 2 who had clinical information, N3: Number of individuals
in Wave 3 who had clinical information
aIncluding shortness of breath, chest distress, expectoration, nausea, vomiting, et al
Table 5 Comparison of time duration from illness onset to different points among different waves
Time duration
(days)
wave 1 wave 2 wave 3 P
No. of cases Median (IQR) No. of cases Median (IQR) No. of cases Median (IQR)
Time between illness onset to first seeking healthcare 127 1 (0–3) 255 1 (0–4) 167 1 (0–3) 0.37
Time between illness onset to hospitalization 75 5 (4–7) 239 5 (3–7) 185 5 (3–7) 0.22
Time between illness onset to lab confirmation 133 8 (6–11) 306 8 6–11) 219 8 (6–10) 0.07
Time between onset to initiation antiviral treatment 50 7 (5–9) 195 6 (4–9) 151 6 (4–8) 0.17
Time between illness onset to death 44 21 (11–34) 127 19 (10–31) 98 16 (10–27) 0.23
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that the first wave occurred at the time of virus emer-
gence, but that the second and third wave cases oc-
curred during the colder or winter months, which is
typical seasonality for avian influenza viruses.
Discussion
Our evaluation revealed more similarities than differ-
ences between the first three waves of virus circulation.
The proportion of males, the age and gender distribu-
tion, the clinical severity and characteristics were similar.
Human cases also continued to be sporadic with only a
few cases occurring in each of the communities. Differ-
ences included a slightly higher median age in the first
wave compared with the other two waves. There was a
slight shift in the geographic distribution of cases from the
southeast coast to more southern mainland China.
Further, the timing of onset dates differed between the
waves shifting initially from February-April to December-
March. In the epidemic curve of H5N1 showed in the
WHO monthly report [12], we figured that H5N1 avian
influenza epidemics are more likely to circulate during
colder or winter months. However, the H7N9 virus first
emerged in late Winter/early Spring 2013 before shifting
to the typical observed seasonality for avian influenza vi-
ruses. In the first wave, the virus emerged in the February
and peaked in April 2013, whereas the second wave began
earlier in the winter season with increasing number of
cases in December 2013, a peak in January 2014 and
a rapid decline in cases by March 2014. Additional
waves of avian influenza A(H7N9) are needed to sup-
port our assumption that this virus tends to circulate
in colder, winter months similar to other avian influ-
enza viruses, such as H5N1.
There are several possible reasons for these similarities
between the waves. First, the H7N9 viruses circulating
during the first three waves were antigenically similar
with a few point mutations causing no change in the
pathogenicity in the internal genes. No substitutions in
key critical binding positions and no antigenic changes
that impact infectiousness or resistance to neuraminid-
ase inhibitors were identified (China CDC, unpublished
data). Second, there were no observed changes in expos-
ure risk prior to illness onset. The main exposures in-
cluded visiting LPMs or poultry contact and were
reported by >80% of cases in all waves [1, 2]. Addition-
ally, the demographic characteristics of cases who gener-
ally visit LPMs did not change between the three waves.
Among the differences between the three waves was a
shift in the geographic distribution of cases. During the
first wave, many of the impacted administrative areas in-
stituted certain control measures to reduce transmission
including policies to improve conditions at LPMs, such
as temporary closure, routine scheduled standard clean-
ing and disinfection practices, and culling of infected
flocks [13–17]. These measures may have resulted in
fewer cases in those provinces during the second wave.
For example, Shanghai closed the LPMs from the begin-
ning of the Spring Festival, January 31 to April 30, 2014
[18]. At the end of this period, only a limited number of
Shanghai markets were re-opened and these were re-
quired to follow strict rules regarding periodic closure and
routine cleaning and disinfection as well as limits to the
movement of poultry. The number of cases reported by
Shanghai Municipality was much lower during the second
wave than the first wave (China CDC, unpublished data).
The shift in geographic distribution may also have
been due to natural spread, especially among poultry, to
areas not affected in the first wave, especially southern
China. Further, this virus spread beyond LPMs to farm
flocks in one northern province that borders North
Korea and Russia [16]. During the second wave, Jilin
Province reported its first human case. The identification
of the case occurred first prompting an environmental
investigation with specimen collection at both poultry
farms and nearby suppliers. From this investigation,
H7N9 positive poultry and environmental specimens
were identified in a farm in a north province of the pre-
viously not impacted areas [19]. In addition, H7N9 cases
were identified in Xinjiang Province, along the western
border of China during the second wave and Hubei in
central China during the third wave. These findings
underscore the importance of surveillance and monitor-
ing for the spread of this virus as well as the difficulty of
identifying this virus in poultry flocks before the occur-
rence of human cases.
The number of cases was much higher in the second
wave, including both more severe and non-severe cases
compared with both the first and third wave. This in-
crease may have been due to early and increased recog-
nition of cases, and further spread of the virus to other
parts of China. Non-severe cases may have been more
likely to be identified in the second wave because of the
two week enhanced surveillance for all ILI case-patients
in the counties or districts where H7N9 cases were de-
tected [6, 20]. Some counties or districts detected a
higher number of non-severe cases through this mech-
anism (China CDC, unpublished data). Another possible
reason for the detection of more non-severe cases may
be the strict monitoring of close contacts. If a close con-
tact developed respiratory symptoms, the contact was
tested for H7N9. These tests might have occurred early
and if the contact received timely treatment this may
have led to non-severe illness [21]. In addition, some
provinces established their own surveillance programs
for respiratory pathogens. Thus, the enhanced systems
in these provinces may be another reason for the in-
crease in the number of detected non-severe cases
during the second wave.
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Although our findings suggested that the epidemic of
H7N9 remains to be sporadic during the three waves in
China, but the emergence of clusters emphasized the
importance of continued surveillance for the cases and
the contact tracing and management for close contacts
of confirmed cases. Given that some clusters occurred in
hospital settings, it highlights the importance of possible
hospital acquired infections and the need for infection
control measures for both prevention and control of
possible outbreaks of this virus and other viruses within
hospital wards.
For context to the surveillance program in China, the
National ILI Surveillance System requires participating
sentinel hospitals in southern provinces to collect speci-
mens from 5 to 15 ILI case-patients per week throughout
the year. In Northern provinces, 10–15 specimens per
week during the typical influenza season (October to
March) and 5–15 per month from April to September.
However, due to the H7N9 emergence, all provinces were
required to increase testing 20 specimens in each surveil-
lance time unit as a requirement of the May 10, 2013 [6].
The increased surveillance activities may have contributed
to the increased detection of H7N9 human cases.
There are some limitations of our study. Our compari-
son relies on data from cases that have been both de-
tected and reported. There were likely some cases that
were not detected and other cases may have been de-
tected but not reported. The main system that detects
respiratory emerging infectious diseases is the PUE sys-
tem [3] which may under estimate the true number of
cases since only severe illness is reported. This may have
resulted in a bias towards greater detection and report-
ing of severe compared with non-severe cases. Further,
because detection required a medically attended illness,
it is possible some cases were missed if the individual
did not seek medical care. However, given the high
awareness of this virus, it is likely that very few patients
with severe illness were missed. Our comparison is likely
an accurate reflection of cases with severe illness, but
may not fully depict non-severe illness.
To address these limitations, community studies are
needed to determine if non-severe illness is more com-
mon than detected and to further determine if the virus
has spread beyond the geographic area where human
cases have been reported. One serologic study con-
ducted by China CDC from May to June 2013 found no
seropositive cases of H7N9 among serum specimens col-
lected from individuals living in a rural area of Jiangxi
Province where at least one human H7N9 case was iden-
tified (China CDC, unpublished data). This finding sug-
gests that infection was uncommon among individuals
living in the same village as the case-patient and the
virus may not be present in the community (or backyard
flocks) but rather limited to areas where there is
exposure to LPMs or commercial poultry. In contrast,
other serological studies found that some individuals
with occupational exposure to poultry were seropositive
for the virus, but had no recent clinical signs or symp-
toms of H7N9 virus infection [22, 23]. In one such sero-
logic study conducted in April and May 2013 in
Zhejiang Province, 6.3% (25/396) of sampled poultry
workers had hemagglutination-inhibition (HI) antibody ti-
ters of ≥80 indicating prior H7N9 infection [22]. In a sep-
arate study among poultry workers conducted in May and
December of 2013 in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, 36/
501 (7.2%) and 56/375 (14.9%) were found to have an HI
antibody titer ≥1:160 to H7N9, indicating a substantial in-
crease in the seroprevalence of antibodies against H7N9
between the two different sampling periods [20]. Further,
of 96 individuals who participated in both surveys, 52
(54.2%) poultry workers had a seroconversion ≥4‐fold rise
in H7N9 antibody titers from May to December implying
serologic evidence of infection during the six months be-
tween surveys [20]. This finding may be explained by the
duration and type of poultry exposure as well as exposure
to other avian influenza viruses. Findings from these sero-
logic studies imply that the risk of H7N9 may not be high
in the community, but individuals with extended expos-
ure, such as poultry workers, may be at high risk for infec-
tion, which is most often asymptomatic.
From our study we found that most H7N9 cases had
LPMs exposure history, and in Zhejiang Province and
Guangdong Province, routine environmental surveillance
showed that LPMs were the most contaminated place by
H7N9 virus, and the detection of H7N9 virus spiked in
cold months [7, 8], which was in accordance with the
epidemic trends of the H7N9 in mainland China. And
several other subtypes of human infections of avian in-
fluenza have also been detected in China, including
H5N1, H5N6, H10N8, and H9N2 et al. Most of the in-
fections also resulted from the live poultry exposure
(sick/dead/healthy-looked poultry) or poultry related en-
vironment exposure, especially live poultry markets [24]
(China CDC, unpublished data), which indicated that
LPMs in China played an important role in the human
infections of avian influenza virus. However, before such
a drastic measure can be implemented, first prevention
and control measures including the strict cleaning and
disinfection measures should be taken in the markets to
reduce the infection risk of residents, which is suggested
in the national technical guideline [20]. Additionally,
poultry workers should wear personal protective equip-
ment when dealing with poultry to protect their health
and also to limit the possible spread of virus. These
measures should be evaluated to determine if they are
effective in reducing transmission or if more drastic pre-
vention methods are necessary to protect the health of
the population. Further, we suggest that people avoid
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direct contact with live poultry, especially poultry in the
markets. In addition to these control measures, studies
should be implemented such as serological studies to
understand the full spectrum of illness, genetic studies
to better understand changes in the virus, perhaps
household transmission studies to better understand
human-to-human transmission, et al.
There is currently no evidence that this virus can
spread efficiently from person-to-person. Data from re-
ported cases show that H7N9 virus infection commonly
causes very severe illness and death. Although there has
been vigilant monitoring of this virus to identify changes
in disease characteristics, no significant changes have
been observed. Should the virus change to become more
transmissible from person-to-person, the next global
influenza pandemic could result, leading to significant
morbidity and mortality. Public health agencies are
continuing to monitor the epidemiology of this virus to
assist in planning control and prevention measures.
Conclusions
Though our case investigation for the first three waves
found few differences between the epidemiologic and
clinical characteristics, there is continued international
concern about the pandemic potential of this virus.
Since the virus continues to circulate among poultry,
causes more severe disease in humans, has the ability to
mutate and become human-to-human transmissible, and
there is limited natural protection from infection in hu-
man populations, it is critical that surveillance systems
in China and elsewhere are monitoring for continued
geographic spread or introduction of this virus in
poultry or persons in their populations.
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